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The Products Liability Class Suit: Preventive
Relief For the Consumer
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more consumers find themselves exposed to a great
variety of product-related risks of harm. Accordingly, the con-
tours of products liability law, whether grounded in tort or in
commercial law or in the more recent administrative relief sys-
tems, are ever shifting to reflect the greater safety-promoting
obligations of manufacturers and the product distribution chain.
Finding a manufacturer liable for a defective product, however,
is a costly process, entailing great expenditures of counsel time
invested in extensive but necessary discovery, development of a
working knowledge of the technical nature of the defect, and pro-
curement of expert testimony for trial. Countless meritorious
products liability complaints, detailing safety hazards and fail-
ures of performance not resulting in serious injuries, fail to sur-
mount the cost structure of the litigation process. These individ-
ual complaints, however, may contain common questions of fact
and law, comprising a "core concept of defect," and may vary
only in purchase settings and postpurchase conduct that may be
irrelevant to the particular relief requested. If that is the case,
then small claimants may enforce manufacturer obligations, not
only through the administrative relief system with its inherent
deficiencies,' but perhaps more successfully via the class com-
plaint.
1. See Note, State Class Actions, 27 S.C.L. REv. 87, 126-27 nn.136-41 (1975). The
usefulness of the administrative relief system is dependent on the strength and flexibility
of the systems as set up, the commitment of manpower and financial resources to govern-
ment agencies, and the fluctuating priorities in rulemaking and other nonadjudicative
functions. For example, John Kelly of the California Rural Legal Assistance Program,
testifying about his experience as plaintiffs' counsel in Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.
3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) before the Senate subcommittee studying
consumer protection measures, noted that the state attorney general had filed suit in 1969
to enjoin fraudulent food freezer dealer practices similar to those attacked in Vasquez and
to secure refund of monies paid by consumers. In an amicus curiae brief to the Vasquez
case, however, the attorney general explained why no further action was taken.
The Office of the California Attorney General, and the Consumer Fraud Unit
in particular, like any other governmental agency, is faced with basic budgetary
limitations and alternative demands on available manpower. The number of
deputies and investigators assigned to the Consumer Fraud Unit throughout the
State of California is smaller than the average small firm engaged in the repre-
sentation of the seller of the goods.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the California Attorney General at 5, Hearings on S. 984, S. 1222,
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Courts, however, are exceedingly cautious when confronted
with a products liability action wedded to the powerful proce-
dural device, the class suit-a combination which is a relatively
recent development.2 A court may easily justify its refusal to cer-
tify that kind of suit on the basis that products liability theory is
riddled with the particularized concepts of proximate cause,
product misuse, assumption of the risk or contributory negli-
gence. Nevertheless, a court may be persuaded to certify a prod-
ucts liability suit as a class action if to do so will. further the
policies of promoting judicial efficiency, preserving actual defen-
ses to class and individual claims, and remedying the judicially
"handicapped" small claimants.'
S. 1378 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-
20, at 95 (1971).
More recently, speaking to the availability of flexible statutory remedies, the Ninth
Circuit in Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974) held that the FTC does not have
the power to order the restitution of monies bilked from innocent consumers through the
use of deceptive trade practices. See also E. Cox, R. FELLnT-rH, & E. SCHuLTz, THE
CONSUamR AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969). Compare the relief available under
the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2064, 2068-74 (1973) with the potential
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1402 (1970) [and] 49
C.F.R. § 577.4(e)(1)-(3) (1972), discussed in note 4 infra.
Criticism should also be directed at general weaknesses of the agency adjudicatory
framework. Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudications, 1 DuKE L.J. 89 (1971). E.g.,
FTC Discovery Rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.31-.39 (1971) (§ 3.33 (depositions) and § 3.38 (failure
to comply sanctions) are narrower in scope and less formidable when there is noncompli-
ance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
2. Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300 N.E.2d 259 (1973), affd,
No. 32726 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 19, 1974); Reardon v. Ford Motor Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 338,
287 N.E.2d 519 (1972). But see Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699,
109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973); Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., Civ. No. 74-3420
(S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 5, 1974). See Appendix infra.
3. Courts are generally reluctant to treat tort actions in class form. Edelman v. Lee
Optical Co., 320 N.E.2d 517 (Ill. Cir. Ct. App. 1974). See generally Annot., 114 A.L.R.
1015 (1938). The reservation centers on a feeling that too many individual issues-
reliance, knowledge of misrepresentation, different statements of misrepresentation-
will frustrate the purposes of the class device. This observation fails to take into conside-
ration group fraud, as it occurred in Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d
964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). In Vasquez several installment purchasers participating
in frozen food plans brought suit for rescission and damages against the original seller and
assignee-finance company. The court held class treatment was proper since identical
memorized sales pitches and standardized form contracts were utilized. Additionally, the
court found an inference of reliance from circumstances surrounding the transactions.
Other California courts have followed this innovative approach in many tort actions. See,
e.g., Collins v. Rocha, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 90 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1970), rev'd, 7 Cal. 3d 232,
497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972); Barquis v. Merchant's Collection Ass'n of Oakland,
7 Cal. 3d 94, 495 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). See also Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58
F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973) and Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 86 (M.D. Pa. 1973)
(sister cases involving fraud under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15
U.S.C. 99 1709(a) & (b)(2) (1970)).
2
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The products liability class suit is new. Few have been at-
tempted; far fewer have had any measure of success. This should
not discourage the creative members of the legal community from
experimenting with this novel form of relief which complements
the system of government product-dafety regulation.4
This note examines judicial treatment of the products class
suit to determine when class certification is warranted. Back-
ground defect analysis of two suits, Gilmore v. General Motors
Corp.' and Anthony v. General Motors Corp.,I illustrates that the
defects on which these suits have been brought are not unique but
rather quite similar to manufacture and design defects of the
ordinary product. In addition, a discussion of specific government
action substantiates the notion that the products liability class
suit complements government regulation by counteracting weak-
nesses in the statutory framework.
II. THE Gilmore AND Anthony SUITS: Two APPROACHES
In 1961, General Motors introduced a "direct air" heater as
standard equipment in its Corvairs.7 The heating system was
4. Consumer actions under the Consumer Product Safety Act [hereinafter CPSA],
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et seq. (1973), are permitted to initiate rulemaking, id. § 2059; review
commission action, id. § 2060; and enforce product safety rules, id. § 2073. These actions
may be instituted by individual consumers or consumer organizations and do not require
class complaints.
Under § 2064, remedies initiated by individuals impliedly for the benefit of a class
include: notification of consumers of defects and safety hazards, repair, replacement, or
refund of purchase price (less reasonable allowance for use if the product is in the con-
sumer's possession for one or more years-a troublesome concept for class recovery). Id. §
2064(d) & (e). Expenses such as attorney fees to obtain § 2064 orders shall not be borne
by consumers. Id. § 2073. The CPSA anticipated class relief situations:
[I]f the Commission determines that any person who wishes to participate in
such hearing is part of a class of participants who share an identity of interests,
the Commission may limit such person's participation in such hearing to partic-
ipation through a single representative designated by such class (or by the
Commission if such class fails to designate such a representative).
Id. § 2064(f). The Act is new, and the private remedies have yet to be tested and the results
evaluated. Still, they hold much potential for the small claimant. Not all product admin-
istrative remedies have that potential. See the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1402 (1970) and 49 C.F.R. §§ 577.4(e)(1)-(3) (1972) (After a vehicle or
vehicle equipment manufacturer notifies owners of safety-related defects, his obligation
to repair or replace does not extend beyond warranty.).
5. 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300 N.E.2d 259 (1973), aff'd, No. 32726 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec.
19, 1974).
6. 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973).
7. The heater was used in all Corvairs, model years 1961 through 1969. The following
is a breakdown of Corvair production:
1961 282,075
3
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designed so that air used to cool the engine entered the passenger
compartment after having been heated by the engine. As de-
signed, the system presented significant risks of harm since a
leaky head gasket or faulty exhaust system could permit carbon
monoxide to be directed into the passenger compartment with
heater use. Exposure to moderate quantities of carbon monoxide,
50 parts per million (ppm) for three hours, could produce signifi-
cant impairment of nervous system functions-reduced coordina-
tion, judgment, and vision.' Repeated exposure to moderate
quantities might result in carbon monoxide poisoning causing
permanent brain damage or the development of cardiovascular
diseases.' Finally, according to medical research, inhaling even
smaller quantities of carbon monoxide, 35 ppm, could be fatal to
those with preexisting cardiovascular diseases."0
On October 29, 1971, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA)1 issued a "special consumer protec-
tion bulletin" alerting consumers to "specific use-risk situations"
in 1961-69 Chevrolet Corvairs. The bulletin, however, was defi-
cient in several respects. The NHTSA publication failed to iden-
1962 292,531
1963 254,571
1964 191,915
1965 235,528
1966 103,743
1967 27,253
1968 15,399
1969 6,000
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Robiner v. General Motors
Corp., No. 172865 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., Apr. 20, 1971).
8. Carbon Monoxide in the Corvair, CONsuisR REPORTS at 572 (Sept. 1971)
[hereinafter CONSUMER REPORTS].
9. Id.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, STUDY ON OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE
TO CARBON MONOXIDE (1973) developed these exposure guidelines: (1) concentrations of
no more than 35 ppm for an 8-hour workday and no level to exceed 200 ppm at any time;
(2) employees with existing cardiovascular diseases not to be exposed to even 35 ppm. Id.
at 1-3. Other medical studies have suggested a causal relationship between heart disease
and carbon monoxide. Internal Pollution: Evidence for Carbon Monoxide as a Cause of
Heart Disease, 46 Sm. A. 230 (March 1974). See also Rose, Carbon Monoxide Intoxica-
tion and Poisoning, 49 J. IOWA MED. Soc. 909-17 (1969); Brice & Roester, The Exposure
to Carbon Monoxide of Occupants of Vehicles Moving in Heavy Traffic, 16 Am POL.
CONTROL ASS'N J. 597-600 (1966). Exposure limits of carbon monoxide to be safely encoun-
tered in automobiles were set at the United States Government Aberdeen Proving Ground
at 100 ppm for 30 to 60 minutes and 50 ppm for more than an hour. CONSUMER REPORTS,
supra note 8, at 573.
11. Created by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 §§ 1 et seq.,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1973). In November 1971, General Motors agreed
to issue the safety defect notification required by statute. See note 25 infra.
[Vol. 27
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tify the specific hazards of carbon monoxide fumes until the sec-
ond page (disclosed earlier as "a problem with engine fumes").12
Even on the second page, it revealed neither evidence of the
amount of carbon monoxide discovered in Corvairs nor the per-
centage of cars tested showing signs of carbon monoxide in the
passenger compartment. 3 The bulletin advised Corvair owners
"who notice fume odors connected with the operation of the
heater, to seek repairs immediately. Until satisfactory repairs are
obtained, operators are advised to keep a window open at least 1
inch at all times during heater operation."" Douglas Toms, act-
ing director of the NHTSA, testifying at the Senate Commerce
Committee Hearings on the Corvair heater, 5 admitted that the
bulletin warning to take corrective steps when noxious fumes
were noticed was inaccurate as carbon monoxide is odorless. Fur-
thermore, he knew of no Chevrolet dealers possessing carbon
monoxide testing equipment capable of detecting leaks of danger-
ous fumes; thus, unnecessary repairs could not be avoided.'" The
bulletin advised owners to seek repairs but mentioned neither the
type nor cost. 7 Lastly, the bulletin did not warn consumers that
12. The NHTSA's acting director, Douglas Toms, appearing before a Senate Com-
merce Committee studying safety problems of the Corvair auto heater, see note 14 infra,
was unable to calculate the ppm of carbon monoxide and exposure times sufficient to
constitute a safety hazard in a particular vehicle. But see note 10 supra. There was,
however, no NHTSA hesitancy in finding a generic "use-risk" in the heater design. See
note 26 infra.
13. Of the 18 tested cars of complaining Corvair owners, 14 leaked carbon monoxide
with the heaters operating, 8 in excess of 50 ppm and 2 with leakage of 200 ppm or over.
As this was an unrepresentative sampling, the NHTSA and Consumers Union conducted
their own tests. The Consumers Union test of 221 cars revealed 25 with readings in excess
of 50 ppm over street concentrations of 20 to 30 ppm; of the 25, 6 registered between 100
and 200 ppm, while 7 others in excess of 200 ppm. The unreleased NHTSA study was
admitted to have produced similar results. If both studies were accurate, of the 900,000
operating Corvairs as of 1971, over 90,000 were leaking dangerous quantities of carbon
monoxide. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 8, at 573.
14. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-
1, at 17 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on Corvair]. The Consumers Union conducted tests
on a car registering 250 ppm with the window down 1 inch as suggested by the NHTSA
in their bulletin and found no significant change in carbon monoxide levels. Completely
opening a side window resulted in 100 ppm, while both windows lowered resulted in 60
ppm, still above recognized safety levels. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 8, at 574.
15. Hearings on Corvair, supra note 14, at 17.
16. Id. at 14-15. Toms also admitted that fumes might enter with the heater turned
off, but the bulletin failed to even mention this possibility.
17. Id. at 18. The cost of carbon monoxide testing machines was estimated at $700
per machine. The repairs, costing $60-170 per vehicle, included the replacement of head
gaskets and the tightening of engine block bolts. No fundamental alteration of the heating
system was contemplated and by the nature of the repairs, there was evidence that they
would be required on a yearly basis, raising the the original cost considerably.
5
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repeated repairs might be necessary.
General Motors' response to this discovery of safety hazards
in the Corvair heater was anything but a full disclosure, despite
evidence of General Motors' awareness of the dangers inherent in
the direct air heater system as early as 1961.18 In a letter ad-
dressed to Chevrolet dealers, General Motors acknowledged the
existence of the consumer protection bulletin but added:
If a Corvair has not been properly maintained or is not in good
working order there is a possibility that objectionable engine
fumes may enter the passenger compartment. . . .No objec-
tionable engine fumes will enter the passenger compartment of
a Corvair that has been properly maintained or is in good work-
ing order. Therefore, in the interest of safety and owner satisfac-
tion, it is important that any fRme complaints be fully diag-
nosed, that the owner be informed of any indicated repairs, and
that he be urged to authorize repair at the very least of any
condition that could permit entry of carbon monoxide into the
passenger compartment."5
General Motors in its own defect notification letter sent to Cor-
vair owners went beyond the NHTSA "one inch" precaution:
"Should it be necessary to continue to drive your car before
The cost-benefit analysis is important in the context of product litigation. One could
adopt the concept of risk spreading, in which case the cost of the risk is placed upon the
ultimate product purchaser in terms of higher costs. Or one may examine the costs and
find that one party is in a position to bear a larger share of the costs and at the same time
increase the benefits of that cost far beyond the benefits produced by having individual
purchasers bear the cost of repair or replacement.
Compare the cost to General Motors of 1,000 carbon monoxide testing machines ($700
per machine) distributed to dealers and the cost to consumers of repair without access to
testing equipment. If 100,000 owners have repairs made, averaging $100 and repeated 3
or 4 times during the life of the vehicle, the total cost could easily exceed $40 million.
Without proper testing, many needless repairs will be made, while other urgently needed
repairs will be precluded by an owner's inability to bear such costs. This hypothetical
problem becomes more real when it is realized that General Motors directed Corvair sales
at lower income groups. See note 23 infra. If General Motors purchases the 1,000 machines
at a total cost of $700,000, the savings to consumers might be substantial if one assumes
that less than 25 percent of the hypothetical 100,000 vehicles actually need repeated
repairs. If General Motors bears the repair costs of 90,000 cars in need of repair, see note
13 supra, and the purchase cost of the testing equipment, General Motors will still spend
less than the potential consumer cost of $40 million postulated earlier.
18. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 8, at 574, quoting a 1961 shop manual: "Because
of the inherent characteristics of the heater, objectionable fumes in the engine compart-
ment may be drawn into the passenger compartment and result in owner complaints."
See also Hearings on Corvair, supra note 14, at 30, referring to a 1965 Chevrolet Service
News Letter mentioning the problem of fume pickup by heaters in 1965-66 Corvairs.
19. CHEVROLEr SERvicE NEWS, March 1971, at 1, reprinted in Hearings on Corvair,
supra note 14, at 20-21.
6
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inspection and necessary repairs can be made, the heater should
be shut off and a window rolled down. ' 2 Unfortunately, General
Motors also included misleading statements downplaying the se-
riousness of the risk:
Chevrolet does not agree with the initial determination of a
defect which was made by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. It is Chevrolet's position that there is no risk if
the Corvair has been regularly inspected and properly main-
tained and is in good working order.
2'
If these statements had been communicated directly to the Cor-
vair owners and repeated by the dealers, they could have easily
lulled those individuals into a false sense of security; if the cars
were regularly serviced no problems would arise. Evidence indi-
cated, however, that periodic maintenance might not preclude
fume leakage. Moreover, the General Motors letter could have
contributed to an owner's determination that the NHTSA defect
finding was merely another example of big government super-
regulation. Lastly, since only improperly maintained vehicles
were said to require repair, bringing a vehicle in might have been
taken as an admission of carelessness. This shifting of responsibil-
ity could only have served to discourage positive owner response.
The General Motors repair policy also presented problems for
Corvair owners. If the new vehicle warranty was in effect, General
Motors would pay for repairs covered by warranty as of 1971 (five
years or fifty-five thousand miles on the power train). Under this
policy, General Motors would pay for corrective repairs to less
than four percent of the nine hundred thousand Corvairs pro-
duced.22 Even the degree of compliance with the warranty repairs
of 1967-69 vehicles was suspect in light of the disclosure that the
Chevrolet division of General Motors had instructed dealers, on
December 5, 1969, to refrain from performing warranty repairs
"unless a safety defect is discovered" (a car-by-car determination
inferred) and to make only those warranty repairs specifically
requested by customers.2
20. Appellant's Brief at 3, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300
N.E.2d 259 (1973). See also note 26 infra.
21. Appellant's Brief at 3.
22. Id. at 24. It is interesting to note that had General Motors been able to forestall
recall one more year, no Corvair would have remained under warranty.
23. General Motors Curbed Warranties Panel Told, Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1970,
at 1. The December instruction was "clarified" by a January 16, 1970, dealer letter. See
Appendix, Hearings on Class Action and other Consumer Protection Procedures Before
1975]
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The 1966 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 4
required a manufacturer to furnish notification of a defect that
the manufacturer determined to be related to vehicle safety. The
manufacturer had to send notice of the defect to original purchas-
ers and all subsequent owners covered by the warranty. There
was, however, no obligation beyond warranties to pay for repairs,
part replacement or costs of bringing in cars for servicing. 5 In a
subsequent recall campaign, General Motors refused to go beyond
what the law required, rejecting requests to pay costs of labor or
parts beyond the normal warranty,' 6 to engage in an extensive
advertising campaign, or to provide carbon monoxide testing fa-
cilities at central locations.
Against this background of weak administrative and token
voluntary efforts, litigation has fared no better. Settling private
suits before trial, General Motors has, as a condition of settle-
ment, impounded complainant files and obtained agreements not
to discuss case specifics."1
Shortly after General Motors issued its notification letter,
several named plaintiffs sought to represent approximately
70,000 Ohio residents who owned 1961-69 Corvairs no longer cov-
ered by warranty. In that suit, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp.,2"
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-43, at 435 (1970).
Reasons have been suggested for General Motors' strict adherence to warranty repair.
During the Senate hearings investigating the direct air heater, it was observed that the
purchasers of Corvairs are "generally poor, the young, the old, and others with limited
incomes; in General Motors' calculations, they are not the new car buyers whose good will
must be sought as a matter of corporate investment." Testimony of Joan Claybrook,
Public Interest Research Group, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1972) cited in Appellant's Brief at 3, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp.,
64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300 N.E.2d 259 (1973).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1973).
25. 49 C.F.R. §§ 577.4(e)(1)-(3) (1972).
26. Subsequent to the Senate hearings, see note 14 supra, General Motors engaged
in a recall campaign, beginning November 22, 1971. Recall No. 71-0224, 1961-69 Corvairs.
This recall affected 629,900 cars ("conditional" recall-no parts or labor beyond normal
warranty).
27. CoNsuban REPORTS, supra note 8, at 572.
28. 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300 N.E.2d 259 (1973), aff'd, No. 32726 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec.
19, 1974). The original complaint was filed shortly after General Motors sent out its defect
notification letter and was subsequently amended in March 1972 to include 46 named
plaintiffs. See also Robiner v. General Motors Corp., Civ. No. 172865 (Cir. Ct., Wayne
County, Mich., Apr. 20, 1971) (voluntary dismissal); Wick v. General Motors Corp., No.
3131-72 (Super. Ct., D.C., 1972) (trial court dismissal of class not appealed).
Robiner was a nationwide class action (later amended to include only Michigan
residents), which requested recall, inspection, and installation of an alternative heating
system at defendant's expense. Although Judge Moody determined that the plaintiffs had
8
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the plaintiffs claimed that the vehicles contained defective heat-
ers which under normal operating conditions permitted fumes to
enter the cab; as relief, they requested inspection, repair without
charge to owners, and reimbursement for repair costs related to
the defect. 29 The court found that a multitude of individual issues
dwarfed whatever common questions could be litigated; the com-
mon question, "unsafe under normal operating conditions,"
would require examination of different model years; only some of
the class were actually exposed to carbon monoxide; the defect
might have been proximately caused by the manufacturing pro-
cess, design, maintenance or repair which varied over the years;
warranty claims would differ on the basis of changed warranties;
consumer expectations would depend on purchases of new or used
vehicles; bargaining positions varied with the nature of the plain-
tiff customer; cars were purchased in different states subjecting
claims to different laws. The court concluded that one could not
even begin to sort out the action for class treatment. Trying
"what would really be thousands of individual cases as one would
be fair to no one,""0 since proceeding in class form might have
obscured defenses available against specific plaintiffs.
stated individual causes of action, Memorandum Opinion at 3, Robiner v. General Motors
Corp., supra, he found the action "predominantly pluralistic" and granted defendant's
motion to dismiss the class primarily on the basis of manageability problems and the
"jungle of conflicts of law questions." Id. at 9. After amendment and a subsequent denial
of certification the action was voluntarily dismissed.
In Wick, a plaintiff class of District of Columbia residents was refused class status
without court opirion. General Motors had argued manageability problems, as well as
defects in the representative capacity of the named plaintiff. Since counsel for plaintiff
believed that factual deficiencies in the named plaintiff as a resident could not be over-
come, he recommended that Wick not be appealed. Plaintiffs in Gilmore, however, ap-
pealed because Ohio had recently adopted the amended Federal Rule 23. Correspondence
with Donald Robiner, counsel for the plaintiffs in Robiner, Wick, and Gilmore, November
1, 1974. See note 43 infra for a brief discussion of the restrictive approach to the recently
adopted rule 23 by the court of appeals in Gilmore.
29. The plaintiffs presented a variety of liability theories: express and implied war-
ranties; public and private nuisances; unenforceable warranty disclaimers; unjust enrich-
ment; failure to warn; negligent design, manufacture and testing; and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim. 300 N.E.2d at 260 (Ohio 1973).
30. Id. at 264. Judge Day in Kuliogowski v. Hart, 23 Ohio Op. 213, 218, 9 Ohio Supp.
89, 94 (1942) noted that the class suit was intended to apply
only to those situations which permit the convenience without prejudice to
justice and without detriment to fundamental safeguards in pleading. It can
only intend to apply to such situations as would permit its recognition without
prejudice to time bound traditions regarded as essential for the protection of the
parties. It cannot be allowed where the defendant's right to due notice of what
he must defend against, or his right to meet each claim in orderly separate
process, is interfered with.
1975]
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The inflexible Gilmore rejection of the products liability ac-
tion3' is incompatible with the spirit of the new Ohio rule 23,
modeled after the federal rule, and exhibits several deficiencies.
In Miles v. New Jersey Motors" the Ohio appeals court noted that
[t]he potential dissimilarity in the remedies and the varying
amounts of damages sought by the named plaintiffs does not
prohibit a class action where the complaint established a com-
mon cause of conduct giving rise to the legal rights sought to be
enforced by the class."
Gilmore can easily be read as violative of the Miles approach to
class actions. In Gilmore the court remarked that the plaintiffs
made no claim that all the cars or a stated proportion were
leaking fumes. 4 Evidently, the court seized upon that omission
to support its conclusion that not all class members were exposed
to carbon monoxide nor all cars unsafe under normal operating
conditions; that defect undermined the common liability ques-
tion and the cohesiveness of the class. Both the NHTSA and
Consumers Union made carbon monoxide tests of representative
samplings of Corvairs.3 5 Those results, as well as those of the
earlier NHTSA tests in response to complaining Corvair owners,
would certainly have overcome the court's objection to the com-
plaint. In addition, they would have revealed the seriousness of
the defects and suggested the advisability of giving the class no-
tice and an opportunity to test vehicles at General Motors' ex-
pense so as to identify the vehicles in need of corrective repair.
Furthermore, the notion that all Corvair owners had to be
31. Judge Angelotta's remark that the class action statute would not cover mass
accidents, 300 N.E.2d at 262 (Ohio 1973), is inaccurate despite his citing, as authority,
Advisory Committee Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Note]. There have been several certified mass
accident class actions. Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla.
1974); Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F.
Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972); American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Hall v. Union Oil Co., Civ. No. 69-889-ALS (C.D.
Cal., filed May 8, 1969); Masterson v. Union Oil Co., Civ. No. 69-331-ALS (S.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 19, 1969). See also Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class
Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 469 (1960); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[3],
at 23-811 n.35 (1974); 7A C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1783, at 117 (1972); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 313
(1970).
32. 32 Ohio App. 2d 350, 291 N.E.2d 758 (1972).
33. Id. at 356, 291 N.E.2d at 763.
34. 300 N.E.2d at 260 (Ohio 1973).
35. See note 13 supra.
[Vol. 27
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similarly aggrieved, that is, that they had to own vehicles ac-
tually leaking fumes through identically designed heaters, was
unresponsive to the plaintiffs' complaint.
During each of the nine model years under scrutiny, General
Motors provided the Corvair with a direct air heater system;
that the cars were essentially the same in this respect cannot be
disputed. Because it is not charged that the defect arose due to
the negligent construction or installation of the heater, but in-
stead, negligent design, the "negligence issue" is indeed com-
mon regardless of the date or place of manufacture."
It was the inherent danger or risk of harm in the heater's design
which supported plaintiffs' request for recall and inspection. Not
every car would leak carbon monoxide or later develop signs of
carbon monoxide in the passenger compartment.37 Such an oc-
currence would depend on the soundness of the exhaust and
power train systems and their rates of deterioration. The defec-
tive heater, however, was capable of producing carbon monoxide
in each car as it came off the assembly line so that broad inspec-
tion was justified on the grounds of the seriousness of the risk, the
inability of the owners to determine carbon monoxide presence
without monitoring equipment, and the moderate costs of locat-
36. Appellant's Brief at 13, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240,
300 N.E.2d 259 (1973) (emphasis added).
37. Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). In response to defense
counsel's argument in Mickle that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the gear
shift, with a knob that had shattered and caused serious injury, was "unreasonably dan-
gerous at the time the automobile was first sold," the court remarked that "[i]t is
inferable that the condition of the knob did not arise from ordinary wear and tear, but
from an inherent weakness in the material of which Ford was aware when the selection
was made." Id. at 236, 166 S.E.2d at 188. Analogously, from the design of the heater, it
was inferable that the whole class of Corvair owners was exposed to serious risks of harm.
See Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally Annot., 51
A.L.R. 3d 8 (1973).
Judge Angelotta stated that each defective or potentially defective Corvair was sub-
ject to different contingencies such as driving records and car maintenance, 300 N.E.2d
at 264, again missing the common question, or what has been characterized as a "common
duty;" there should be nothing in the design capable of causing injury if those contingen-
cies occur.
The relation of the defect in Gilmore and its "first cause" should be compared with
the defects and "first causes" of the crashworthiness cases. Recovery under the concept
of crashworthiness is allowed because accident contexts are a recognized fact of highway
experience and a manufacturer has a duty not to create conditions which increase the
likelihood or seriousness of injury once a crash situation is encountered. Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In Gilmore, the duty is clearly present when
one recognizes that the "first cause" is the frequently encountered gasket failure.
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ing that equipment centrally ($700 per machine)." The trial court
stressed the importance of the setting of the individual sale and
of the postpurchase conduct, i.e., car maintenance and driving
records. The court, however, should have accorded no signifi-
cance to these factors in light of the nature of the complaint.
Since the car design, rather than car use or misuse, was under
scrutiny, subsequent owner conduct should have been of no con-
sequence.
Perhaps, if the plaintiffs in Gilmore had narrowed their com-
plaint to recall, inspection, repair or reimbursement, or injunc-
tive relief, the court might have allowed the action to continue."
With an injunctive claim, the plaintiffs need not have shown
specific amounts of damage to have established manufacturer
liability. If the complaint had been phrased properly-"A serious
potential for injury exists regardless of the maintenance record or
other post-purchase plaintiff conduct"-individual questions
may have been foreclosed. Moreover, individuals with claims for
actual damages, if concerned about splitting their cause of action
to their detriment, would have had an opportunity "to opt out"
of the Gilmore class.
40
Finally, subsequent to the main opinion denying class certifi-
cation, Judge Angelotta announced that the plaintiffs could file
an amended complaint "absent class allegations."'" It could be
argued that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting
amendment of the complaint to individual relief." Under Ohio
rule 15, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
... .Leave of court shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires.""
38. See note 17 supra.
39. Cf. Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969),
reviewed in L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCrs LLABmrry § 46A.02[43, at 16A-43 (1974).
The Gilmore court evidently felt that the action was essentially for damages. 300 N.E.2d
at 264 (Ohio 1973). Such a belief would account for Gilmore's stressing postpurchase
owner conduct. In Robiner v. General Motors Corp., No. 172865 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County,
Mich., Apr. 20, 1971), plaintiffs did ask for "affirmative" injunctive relief- installation
of an alternative hearing system. But injunctive actions requiring positive action have
been viewed as damage suits with large out-of-pocket expenses required of the defendant.
In Robiner, a request for injunctive relief was not sufficient to overcome the manageability
problems of the action. See note 28 supra.
40. Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 705, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254,
257 (1973).
41. Judgment Entry at 1, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300
N.E.2d 259 (1973).
42. Appellant's Brief at 43.
43. OHIo R. CIV. PRO. 15. OHIO R. CIV. PRO. 23(C)(4) states that a class action may
[Vol. 27
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The apprehension expressed in Gilmore has not dissuaded
California courts from certifying products liability claims as class
actions. In Anthony v. General Motors Corp.," a unanimous Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs could sue on be-
half of a class defined to include all purchasers of defendant's
trucks equipped with allegedly defective disc wheels made by
Kelsey-Hayes Corporation.
The National Highway Safety Bureau (now NHTSA) first
notified General Motors of the defect in 1968 following reports of
wheel failures.45 Although the agency attributed these failures to
flaws or cracks in the wheel gutter, General Motors argued that
owner abuse was the cause. (It is significant to note that reports
of wheel failures in 1965 had led to General Motors' decision to
discontinue use of the particular wheel at the end of that model
year.) In May 1969, General Motors advised approximately
280,000 truck owners of a serious risk of cracking wheels or metal
failure under the usual heavy load of an over-the-cab camper.
The company urged owners of these campers or other heavy spe-
cial truck bodies to replace the wheels as soon as possible; Chev-
rolet dealers would assist in owner purchases of satisfactory re-
placements. The NHTSA, continuing its investigation, informed
General Motors in August 1969 that a preliminary determination
confirmed the presence of a defect relating to motor vehicle
safety. Before a final determination by the NHTSA, General
Motors adjusted its original position and offered, by way of settle-
ment, to send a second notification letter advising owners that
General Motors would replace wheels without owner expense on
all trucks equipped with campers or other special bodies.46 In
be maintained as to particular issues or a class may be divided into subclasses. Subdivi-
sion (D)(4) provides for court orders "requiring that the pleadings be amended to elimi-
nate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons and that the action
proceed accordingly." See Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 705,
109 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258 (1973). The court of appeals found none of the plaintiffs' objections
to the trial court's denial of certification compelling. In a rather unimpressive opinion,
with less than adequate suporting authority, the court missed the gist of plaintiff's com-
plaint. The court of appeals reiterated the trial court's incorrect observation that the class
was not a "class" unless all were exposed to carbon monoxide. The court misplaced
emphasis on the individual sales transactions and ignored the basic concept of defect
discussed above and the lack of appreciable change in the direct air heater over the
different model years. Finally, employing a standard judicial analytical method, the court
ignored Anthony v. General Motors Corp., supra.
44. 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973).
45. CCH CONSUMER PROD: SAFETY GUIDE 15,880 (1973).
46. United States v. General Motors Corp., 377 F. Supp. 242, 245 (D.D.C. 1974)
(appeal pending). The agency, however, reserved its right to reopen the investigation.
1975]
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March 1970, Ralph Nader, unsatisfied with General Motors' vol-
untary compliance, requested the court in Nader v. Volpe" to set
aside the settlement and to order a reopening by the NHTSA of
the General Motors file to consider whether a defect existed in all
the trucks equipped with the suspect Kelsey-Hayes wheels. An
agency remand produced a September 1970 report confirming a
general defect on all trucks with or without special bodies or
campers and recounting a history of recurring wheel failures on
trucks bearing loads well below stated wheel capacities." Again
NHTSA notified General Motors of the defect in November 1970,
directing it to send out a third notice to truck owners. General
Motors refused, and the government instituted suit for violation
of its statutory notice duty."°
Id. As of 1974, General Motors has replaced approximately 62,000 of the 810,000 wheels
installed. Id. at 246.
47. 320 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1970).
48. 377 F. Supp. at 246 n.14.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (1973) states that if the Secretary (Transportation Depart-
ment) determines that a motor vehicle contains a defect relating to motor vehicle safety,
the manufacturer shall be notified. The manufacturer has an opportunity to show that
there has been no failure of compliance with vehicle safety standards or that the alleged
defect does not affect vehicle safety. If he is unsuccessful, the Secretary may direct the
manufacturer to furnish § 1402(b) notice to customers of the existence of the defect, the
risks it poses, and the remedial measures to be taken.
50. United States v. General Motors Corp., 377 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1974) (appeal
pending). General Motors was subsequently fined $100,000 for violating its notice duty.
BNA PROD. SAFETr & LmB. REP. 667 (Aug. 8, 1974). Although the government suit was
subsequent to Anthony, it should be analyzed to reveal the context of the Anthony com-
plaint, the complementary quality of Anthony to government regulation, and the differ-
ences between the proof required to show a breach of a statutory duty to warn and common
law theories of liability. General Motors' duty was to warn of safety defects or use-risks
under the federal regulatory statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1402 (1973). Anthony went one step
further, suggesting that General Motors might also have had a duty to replace defective
wheels at no further expense to truck owners.
In United States v. General Motors Corp., supra, the defendant argued that the
government be held to a standard of proof analogous to the proof required of private
product litigation showing "[e]ither that the wheels were not properly designed or manu-
factured or that they currently fail when used in their intended manner or nonoverloaded
straight pickups at a rate posing an unreasonable risk of accidents." Memorandum of
Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 22. 377 F. Supp.
at 248. The government, in support of its request for summary judgment, argued that it
must show only "a large number of failures" without regard to overload or intended use.
The court found the government's position more persuasive, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1391(11)
("'Defect' includes any defect in performance, construction, components, or materials in
motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment." (emphasis added)) and 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1)
(" 'Motor vehicle safety' means the performance of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equip-
ment in such a manner that the public is protected against unreasonable risk of accident
occurring as a result of the design, construction or performance of motor vehicles. .. ."
(court's emphasis)). 377 F. Supp. at 248-49. These sections, stated the court, are sugges-
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The Anthony complaint was filed before the first defect no-
tice was sent out; the Anthony appellate decision was handed
down after the third notice was requested and while a contem-
poraneous government suit was pending to assess a $400,000
fine against General Motors.5 The Anthony plaintiffs, as in
Gilmore, asked that the defendant corporation be required to
recall and pay for wheel replacement. 52 Although the trial court
tive of a congressional intent to "go beyond the common law theories of negligence, strict
liability, and warranties which provide that misuse of the product is a defense to liability
for damages caused by the failure of a product," id. at 249, and to require a defect notice
when there was a "cognizable defect in design or manufacture" and when evidence re-
vealed "a large number of failures of components or materials, i.e., failures in
performance, regardless of the cause." Id. (court's emphasis).
Proof of the "large number of failures" was more than adequate. The accumulated
data supporting summary judgment, 377 F. Supp. at 251, is summarized as follows:
(1) 2,361 reports of failures received by General Motors;
(2) General Motors never denied that a significant number of wheels actually failed;
(3) 160 verified affidavits of 436 actual failures;
(4) Based on a random sampling and the use of 95 percent confidence intervals, over
707 owners would be willing to furnish affidavits revealing 1,503 failures;
(5) General Motors admitted that based on the more than 2,300 reported failures,
it is more likely than not that 700 owners would have had wheel failures.
51. One should note that the government defect finding played a significant role in
the Anthony court determination that the action was not without merit. 33 Cal. App. 3d
at 707, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 259. One should compare the Anthony treatment of NHTSA
defect finding with Gilmore's failure to even mention the defect or use-risk determination.
Interestingly, in Robiner, the Michigan trial court said that the requested relief, heater
replacement, would turn the court into a quasi-agency or legislative body-a role incon-
sistent with traditional judicial function. Memorandum Opinion at 12, Robiner v. General
Motors Corp., No. 172865 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., Apr. 20, 1971).
52. Although the Anthony complaint was more modest in liability theory than
Gilmore since it argued just express and implied warranties, the named plaintiffs repre-
sented a national class, as opposed to the Ohio class of Gilmore. In Robiner, before the
Michigan Corvair action was amended, plaintiff's argument for a national class was re-
jected.
This state court can find no guideline to lead it to conclude it has the overall
authority to decend [sic] from the mountain top commanding what type of
heating system must be acceptable and binding on a nationwide basis for all
Corvair owners under all circumstances in all jurisdictions. In such context the
matter transends [sic] from mere legal litigation to Federal legislative direc-
tion.
Memorandum Opinion at 12, Robiner v. General Motors Corp., No. 172865 (Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, Mich., Apr. 20, 1971). The court's remarks, however, may be viewed more
appropriately as criticism of the relief requested in Robiner, installation of an alternative
heating system.Cf. City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 290 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); L. FRurtER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, § 46A.02[4], at 16A-39 n.17. Neither
Gilmore nor Anthony were that restrictive in the relief demanded. The court in Robiner,
however, found another weakness in the nationwide class.
Serious questions as to whether any eventual determination, favorable or unfa-
vorable, would be binding upon any certain nonresident member of the class are
apparent. Certainly if an adverse decision to Plaintiffs were to be rendered in
15
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denied certification, the court of appeal reversed, finding that the
requisite "community of interest" did not depend on identical
recovery. Additionally, having the various class members prove
their separate claims was only one factor in determining the via-
bility of the class suit.53
In Gilmore, the trial court observed that because the Cor-
vair owners were not all exposed to carbon monoxide, the class
structure was defective. 4 General Motors in Anthony attempted
to raise a similar objection, as a defect in standing, by arguing
that not all the plaintiffs had suffered personal injury or property
damage. The Anthony court found this objection unresponsive to
the complaint. Although the class would include those who suf-
fered particularized damages, the prayer for relief was merely
that General Motors be required to replace the defective wheels.
Under this broad class definition, these plaintiffs had standing.5
In reversing, the court of appeal held that:
[t]he gravamen of plaintiffs' case is the contention that all
wheels of the type involved contain an inherent defect which
may cause them to fail at some time, even if loaded within the
limits of the representations discussed below and even if main-
tained and driven with due care. It is patent from the record
before us that the issue is one which will require an elaborate
this cause, due process considerations would formulate substantial hurdles if
Defendant were to raise the issue of res adjudicata in any subsequent similar
individual action by a nonresident in a foreign state jurisdiction. As any judg-
ment may not be binding upon the purported class, due process, fair play, as
well as the orderly administration of justice negates [sic] and precludes [sic]
the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court as requested.
Memorandum Opinion at 13-14, Id. (citations omitted). This argument was presented in
Anthony and found to be premature since issues defining the class and the adequacy of
notice to nonresident class members had not been determined by the trial court. 33 Cal.
App. 3d at 708, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 260. See generally Note, Expanding the Impact of State
Court Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1002, 1012 (1971).
53. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 709, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 256, quoting from Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
54. Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 300 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ohio 1973).
55. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 257. The court observed that those
individuals with separate claims for personal injury and property damage may unwittingly
be splitting their causes of action by remaining in the class. Id. Notice, however, could
be sent apprising them of this fact and affording them an opportunity "to opt out." This
is a common solution employed by the federal courts when faced with rule 23(b)(3) dam-
age class actions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides (in part):
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable .... The notice shall
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date ....
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and probably a protracted trial. It is exactly the sort of common
issue for which class actions are designed. 6
The Anthony court admitted that if damages were sought, a sec-
ond stage would be necessary to consider the issues of assumption
of the risk, negligent maintenance, driving or overloading, and
individual damages. 51 Since damages were not requested, the
Anthony recovery was not at all dependent on the conduct of
individual purchasers. Finally, on remand, if excessive individual
subtrials were involved,
the proper action [would be] to require plaintiff to eliminate
such claims from the requested relief and to see that potential
members of the plaintiff class are advised of such limitations;
dismissal of the action as a whole, on that ground [would be]
.. .neither necessary nor proper.5
Nor has California accepted the Gilmore blanket rejection of
warranty claims. In Anthony, General Motors disputed the feasi-
bility of the class suit on breach of express warranty, stressing the
absence of evidence offered at trial to establish a basis for the
warranty-either a scheme of nationwide advertising or reliance
by the class. Because the court had not conducted a hearing on
the merits, it was naturally hesitant to foreclose at that early
stage the possibility that the plaintiff could produce evidence of
advertising sufficient to create express warranties. The court took
judicial notice of General Motors' national advertising touting
"the excellence and reliability of [General Motors] products."59
The public could have construed this advertising as a warranty
56. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 257. Anthony was available to plaintiffs'
counsel in Gilmore and enthusiastically argued on appeal, but to no avail. Appellant's
Brief at 15, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300 N.E.2d 259 (Ohio
1973).
57. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 258. This disposition of the case by the
Anthony court is indicative of its liberal attitude toward class actions. Several commenta-
tors, with a different attitude, have indicated that the class device is probably improper
for the recovery of personal injuries. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 31, at 102; L.
FRUMER & M. FRIDMAN, supra note 39, § 46A.0214][a], at 16A-35. Such a view is
attributable to the fact that the individual damage action is usually an adequate remedial
avenue. See Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79, 81 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (class
suit denied; emphasis on individual control of 15 pending actions). The position against
class actions for personal injuries, however, does not take into consideration the possibility
of bifurcated trials. Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972); J. Moopx, supra
note 31. See also Note, State Class Actions, supra note 1, at 121-22 nn. 119-23, 155-56 nn.
268-72.
58. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 258. (emphasis added). But see City of
San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974).
59. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 706, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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that the trucks equipped with the Kelsey-Hayes wheels were free
from an inherent risk of failure.
In addition to its judicial notice of advertising claims, the
court mentioned the plates on the trucks which referred to a
user's manual given to each truck purchaser. During oral argu-
ment, defendant's counsel conceded that the plate together with
the manual produced a warranty that
the wheels, if loaded within limits therein set forth, were safe
and adequate for such loads. It is that warranty of adequacy and
safety, within those load limits, which plaintiffs contend was
and is false; as we read the record, plaintiffs contend that that
representation was part of the original sale transaction and that
it constituted a warranty upon which plaintiffs and the fellow
members of their class were entitled to rely.6'
In an earlier case, Metowski v. Triad,6" the California Court
of Appeal certified in class form an action against the manufac-
turer and seller of electronic cameras for fraud and deceit, and
breaches of express and implied warranties of merchantability.2
In addition, the court found a well-defined community of inter-
ests in questions of fact affecting the class of purchasers. 3 In
defending against the warranty claims, defendants argued that
timely notice of the breach to the seller, a necessary step in all
warranty actions, could only be proved by the testimony of indi-
vidual purchasers.64 The court stated that although notice might
60. Id.
61. 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 104 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1972).
62. The fraud claim was handled completely within the parameters of Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) (Identical written
misrepresentations which, if legally sufficient to support the fraud complaint, created a
persuasive inference of reliance).
63. The court set out the common questions or elements, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 340, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 603:
In the case at bench, the complaint contains the following allegations establish-
ing a well-defined community of interest in questions of fact affecting the class
of purchasers described therein: each plaintiff signed an identical installment
sales contract; each plaintiff was induced to purchase a camera because of
warranties made by defendant; each plaintiff paid the same purchase price;
each plaintiff received directly from defendent a Fotron camera identical in
appearance, design, mechanical function, size, shape, and weight; each plaintiff
received written warranties from defendant; each plaintiff relied upon the war-
ranties made by defendant; as to each plaintiff there was a breach of warranty;
each plaintiff sustained damage. It may easily be assumed that these issues
which are common among the members of the class would be the principal issues
in any individual action.
64. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2607 (1973).
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be a meaningless ritual when the seller, acting in bad faith, was
aware of the breach at the time of sale, the statutory notice would
still apply. The plaintiffs, however, argued that the defendant
seller/manufacturer was notified of its collective breach of war-
ranty. The court stated that
[c]onceivably, the statutory demand of notice might be satis-
fied by proof of complaints by some but not all the buyers of the
product. Such an approach might be particularly appropriate
where the failure of the merchandise to conform to express war-
ranties was known to or reasonably discoverable by the seller at
the time of the sales.65
Even if class notice had not been proper, that issue could have
been litigated, after liability had been determined, in a second
proceeding along with proof of damages on individual claims."5
The Metowski court did make several distinctions between
proper and improper warranty class actions ignored in Gilmore.
Express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability
would require no individual reliance."7 An action for breach of an
implied warranty for a particular purpose, however, arose only
when the purchaser intended to use the goods for that purpose,
the particular buyer relied on the seller's skill in selecting the
goods, 8 and the seller had reason to know of that reliance. These
65. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 339, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
66. Id. at 341, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
67. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 [hereinafter UCC] (express warranties by
affirmation, promise, description, sample). Comment 3 provides:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no partic-
ular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the
fabric of the agreement.
See J. WHrm & W. SUMMERs, THE UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE 277-88 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as J. WHrrm & W. SUMMERS]. Advertisements have been construed as part of the
bargain. E.g., Harris v. Belton, 258 Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968); Capital
Equipment Enterprises, Inc. v. North Pier Term. Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 264, 254 N.E.2d
542 (1969); Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 457 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 159 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1970). Comment 3 refers to
affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain. Thus, unless
advertisements can be characterized as being made during a bargain they are not express
warranties. J. WHrr & W. SumMERs, upra, at 280. Of course one may argue for an after-
the-sale modification of UCC § 2-209. One should also note that a discussion of reliance
is noticeably absent from UCC § 2-314 (implied warranty, merchantability, usage of
trade) and the accompanying comments. "Part of the Bargain" is not a limitation of UCC
§ 2-314 implied warranties.
68. UCC § 2-315 (implied warranty, fitness for particular purpose) provides: "Where
the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
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elements could be established only by each purchaser's testimony
relating to the circumstances of each sales transaction. Since
there was no common method to prove purchaser reliance, partic-
ular purpose, and seller knowledge, the Metowski court refused
to treat the particular purpose warranty action in class form.
III. CONCLUSION
As noted earlier, it is the rare products liability suit that will
proceed in class form, and far fewer will ever succeed on their
merits.
As long as artificial court created barriers are allowed to block
the products liability class action, manufacturers can afford to
continue to poorly design automobiles and cut corners in pro-
duction, untouched by legal action. As long as manufacturers
can get away with such negligence, there is no economic incen-
tive for them to begin complying with their duty to provide a
product which has been adequately tested, thoroughly inspected
and safe for the use for which it is intended.69
The value, however, of the products liability class suit cannot be
measured by successful litigation of the substantive claims alone.
The value must also be measured in terms of its sobering effect
on a recalcitrant manufacturer who refuses to acknowledge the
consuming public's expectations of his obligations to market safe
products. One would hope that the general public is not so accus-
tomed to shoddily manufactured products as to anticipate and
condone either serious carbon monoxide leakage in passenger
compartments of cars or wheel failures under expected normal
use. At some point in the presentation of the class complaint,
with all its adverse publicity, the settlement value of acquiescing
in recall and bearing repair and replacement expenses will begin
to look like a reasonable alternative to litigation." No large corpo-
select or furnish suitable goods . . . ." See also UCC § 2-315, Comment 1; J. WHrE &
W. SUMMERS, supra note 67, at 296-99.
69. Apellant's Brief at 47, Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 300
N.E.2d 259 (1973).
70. Suggestions of settlement should not give rise to Professor Handler's cry of black-
mail. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUm. L. Ray. 1, 9 (1971). There
is, after all, a settlement value to most litigation.
Also, the safety defects of Gilmore and Anthony could hardly be classified with the
technical violations of Truth in Lending which have drawn considerable criticism when
presented as a class complaint. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Note, State Class Actions, supra note 1, at 162-67 nn.299-326; Note,
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ration can afford to indefinitely remain in the public eye as its
countless failures are paraded before the court."
Consumer Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23: Consumer Protection Causes of Action
Available Under Federal Statues, 25 S.C.L. Ray. 240, 272-76 (1973). The demands of the
product class action may be no greater than those of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et seq.
(1973) discussed in note 4 supra.
Finally, if compromise is in order, to protect "legitimate" commercial interests, a
system similar to the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 1750
et seq. (1973) could be devised. Under § 1782, before a damage action will be allowed to
proceed in class form, the plaintiffs must give a defendant opportunity to take appropriate
corrective steps, e.g., repair, replacement or restitution. This scheme would be consistent
with the relief requested in both Gilmore and Anthony, as long as the corrective measures
were under court scrutiny.
71. In attempting to enforce an industry-wide standard, Rheingold encounters diffi-
culties beyond those of Anthony or Gilmore. Without evidence of consipiracy or some form
of interaction among the defendants, courts have disallowed class suits against either a
defendant class or actually joined defendants. Phillips v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 38
Cal. App. 3d 901, 908, 113 Cal. Rptr. 688, 693 (1974); Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 3d 193, 200-02, 112 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1974); Payne v. United
California Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3d 850, 859, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672, 678 (1972) (insufficient
community of interests in the class). In federal court, the following objections to a class
suit against a defendant class have been made: (1) The class representative does not have
a cause of action against all the defendants; (2) The named representative inadequately
represents the class; (3) The action is best conducted by a government agency. See La
Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463-68 (9th Cir. 1973); Weiner v. Bank
of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Contra, Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l
Bank, 60 F.R.D. 604, 611-14 (W.D. Pa. 1973); 3 CLAss Ac'OON REP. 19-20, 171 (1974).
Although adequacy of representation by the named plaintiff may be a serious problem
in a case of this type, the La Mar court merely asserted that a plaintiff who has no cause
of action against the defendant cannot "fairly and adequately protect the interests" of
those who do have such causes of action. 489 F.2d at 466. The better approach to the
problem might be to require an actual showing of inadequacy to defeat a class action
against a defendant class. Cf. Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 987, 312 N.E.2d
753 (1974).
I Rheingold, if a particular defendant can be identified as the source of the drug used
by the named plaintiff's mother, then perhaps the class will be redefined. Nevertheless,
the named plaintiff could represent a subclass of the larger original class. Furthermore,
the named plaintiff could press for continued discovery to afford an opportunity to add
new plaintiffs to represent other definable subclasses in suits against the remaining drug
companies. Budget Fin. Plan v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. App. 3d 794, 110 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1973). At this level of complexity, sufficient judicial economy maybe obtained by consoli-
dation of discovery and pretrial proceedings, while separating trial of the liability issues
to prevent potential jury confusion. L. FRUER & M. FRIEMAN, supra note 31, §
46A.05[1]-[2], at 16A-66 to 74. See also, Note, Joinder of Causes of Action in South
Carolina, 26 S.C.L. Rav. 591 (1975).
On the other hand, if the named plaintiff cannot be identified as having a cause of
action against a particular defendant, joinder may be proper under the notion of joint
creation of a group risk. See Hall v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). To this end the characterization of each class member as having an
undivided joint and common interest in creating the research fund may be extremely
helpful in surmounting the jurisdictional amount problems. Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F.
Supp. 945, 946.52 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1971). See
also Cass Clay Inc. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 35 (D.S.D. 1974).
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Appendix
Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., filed in August 1974,
represents the most recent and ambitious attempt to certify a
products liability class suit. Initially, the suit reaffirms the notion
that the products liability class suit complements government
regulation by enforcing a manufacturer's duty to "stand behind
the integrity of its product." The form of relief-identification
and notification of the "at risk" class members, and creation of
a fund to pay for continued research and medical treatment-is
quite similar to the preventive "equitable" relief of Anthony and
Gilmore. Because of this characterization, individual questions
concern only identification of class members and do not under-
mine the liability issues which depend on the common questions:
creation of the risk, nature of the duty owed, reasonableness of
pre- and post-marketing research and adequacy of warnings. Fi-
nally, Rheingold goes beyond even Anthony in one respect-an
attempt to enforce an industry-wide safety obligation by joining
all companies which marketed that drug.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Civ. No. 3420-74
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
.--------------------------------x
JOYCE B. RHEINGOLD, on behalf of JULIA
L. RHEINGOLD, an infant, and all other
persons similarly situated,
Class Action Complaint
Plaintiff, (In Part)
Plaintiff Demands A
-against- Trial-by Jury
E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC. [and 18
other companies]
Defendants.
----.---------............------------------ X
Plaintiff, by her attorney, PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, com-
plaining of the defendants, respectfully alleges:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
[Omitted]
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGATIONS
4. (a) This action is brought as a class action under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). The class
of which plaintiff is a member consists of all those girls in the
United States who were exposed to the risk of development of
vaginal cancer and other conditions due to the use, by their moth-
ers during pregnancy, of drugs manufactured by the defendants.
(b) The named plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect
the interest of this class. Plaintiff is highly motivated to deter-
mine the facts and prosecute the action. Her counsel represents
his intention to carry through the litigation to a just conclusion
on behalf of every plaintiff eventually identified.
(c) Common questions pertinent to all members of the class
include:
(i) whether the defendants were under a common duty of
care toward plaintiff and the other members of the class which
duty they have breached;
(ii) whether the dfendants [sic], by virtue of manufactur-
ing and selling products which have created the risk of vaginal
cancer and other conditions in the members of the class, are liable
to the class for medical examination, treatment, and research
into the causes, prevention, and cure of vaginal cancer and other
conditions;
(iii) whether the defendants are liable to the class for seek-
ing out the unidentified class members in order to inform them
of the risks created by their use of the defendants' products.
(d) The duties and responsibilities sought to be imposed
are uniform for all plaintiffs and all defendants, and the relief
sought is identical for all class members. The relief by its nature
will apply to all class members as a group. For these reasons, a
class action herein is superior to other available methods for fair
and efficient adjudication of the matters involved.
(e) The requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are met in that de-
fendants have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class thereby making final injunctive relief appropriate with
respect to the class as a whole.
(f) The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met in that com-
mon questions predominate and the size of the class is so great
and so unknown as to make proceeding by separate suit impossi-
ble. Plaintiff is unaware of any demonstrated interest by poten-
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tial individual members of the class in guiding their own actions,
and is unaware of any similar litigation now pending, although,
upon information and belief, several actions are pending by indi-
viduals who claim injuries against individual drug companies. It
is desirable to concentrate the litigation in one forum in which
one uniform type of relief nationwide is sought, with the oversee-
ing of the administration of that relief coming from one source.
Once the class is identified, it will be a manageable class.
5. During the period from 1946 to 1972, defendants manu-
factured and sold large quantities of synthetic estrogens known
as diethylstilbestrol, stilbestrol and dienestrol, in prescription
drug form.
6. The purpose of these drugs was for administration by
doctors to pregnant women to prevent loss of the fetus by sponta-
neous abortion.
7. An unknown number of women, upon information and
belief in the hundreds of thousands, have consumed the stated
drug.
8. The consumption of these drugs by these pregnant
women has caused cancer of the vagina and other dangerous con-
ditions to appear in the female offspring, usually ten to twenty
years after their birth.
9. An unknown number of girls whose mothers consumed
these drugs during pregnancy have already developed the said
conditions, and some have died therefrom, especially those in
whom the diseases went undetected for long periods of time.
10. As a matter of scientific predictability, a number of
girls will in the future develop these conditions as a result of their
mothers having already used the said drugs.
11. Defendants have made great sales of these drugs over
the years stated and great profits on the sales thereof.
12. In 1972 the Federal Food and Drug Administration
banned the further sale and use of these synthetic estrogen drugs
for prevention of abortion on the basis of their carcinogenic poten-
tial.
13. Many, if not virtually all, of the girls at risk, and their
parents as well, are unaware today of the risk created by the
consumption of these drugs.
14. Many physicians are likewise unaware today of the risks
created by the consumption of these drugs and have no way of
knowing even if their patients were exposed to them.
15. The form of vaginal cancer and other conditions which
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occur in daughters of mothers who consumed these drugs is ex-
tremely unusual, especially in young women, and the symptoms
are such as to make a correct diagnosis and proper treatment
difficult when the treating physician is unaware of the nature of
these conditions.
16. Plaintiff, Joyce B. Rheingold, consumed diethylstil-
bestrol of an unknown brand and manufacturer in 1963 at the
direction of her obstetrician, for the purpose of preventing the loss
of the fetus she was then carrying.
17. The aforesaid fetus was born July 17, 1964, and named
Julia L. Rheingold, the daughter of plaintiff, Joyce B. Rheingold
and Paul D. Rheingold, counsel for plaintiff. All three persons
reside within this Court's jurisdiction.
18. Upon information and belief, defendants have placed
no advertisements in medical or lay journals, have issued no let-
ters to doctors or the public, and have taken no other steps to
alert those at risk, the public at large, or members of the medical
profession about the risks involved.
19. Upon information and belief, defendants have at no
time done research to determine how their drugs have caused the
said conditions, what are early warning signs of these conditions,
what may prevent the appearance or growth of these conditions,
and what may cure them.
20. Upon information and belief, defendants have not set
up any programs by which girls at risk would be given periodic
medical examinations.
21. In so manufacturing, selling and distributing the said
drug, defendants have created an unreasonable risk of harm to
plaintiffs.
22. Defendants knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known that these drugs were dangerous and were
capable of causing the conditions which they are alleged above to
have caused.
23. Defendants have a social, moral and legal responsibility
to stand behind the integrity of a product which they have manu-
factured, sold, promoted and profited from, especially after they
have discovered that a drug which once to them may have seemed
harmless has been determined to bear such a disproportionately
great and unreasonable risk of serious injury and death.
24. Defendants are under a continuing duty to investigate
the nature and qualities of the drugs which they marketed even
though they are no longer for sale, so long as persons who came
19751
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in contact with that product remain within the zone of danger
created by that product.
25. Defendants are under a duty, based upon the peculiar
risk which they have created, to issue warnings, as above de-
scribed, to the public and medical profession, to assist physicians
and the public in determining the type and magnitude of the risk,
to ascertain the girls at risk, to prevent the conditions from ap-
pearing, and to find a cure for the diseases.
26. Defendants have an obligation to pay for the costs of
routine medical examination of all girls exposed to the unreasona-
ble risk which they have created and to pay for the costs in deter-
mining early diagnostic signs, and prompt and adequate treat-
ments of these conditions.
27. Defendants have an obligation to pay for the medical
and other health expenses of persons who have developed injuries
as a result of the use of their said drugs.
28. Defendants, in violation of their aforesaid duties, were
negligent in their design, testing, investigating, experimenting
with, manufacturing, packaging, marketing, distributing, in-
specting, promoting, and labeling of the said drugs, and in their
dealing with regulatory bodies.
29. By the aforesaid conduct, defendants also violated var-
ious statutes, regulations, ordinances, standards and codes, in-
cluding provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act,
as set forth in 21 U.S.C. 351, 352 and 355.
30. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for many of
the actual and potential injuries and harms that may ensue, and
will suffer irreparable injury unless assisted by the equity powers
of this Court. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief for herself and on
behalf of all other class members at risk, as follows: that the
defendants be compelled to create and maintain a fund which
will provide medical examinations, and research programs to de-
termine the cause, prevention, and cure of the cancer which is
caused by the use of defendants' products and which will allow
for publicizing the dangers to the public and the medical profes-
sion.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
31. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation contained
in paragraphs 1 through 27, 29 and 30.
32. By virtue of the conduct previously alleged, defendants
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have become strictly liable to plaintiffs for marketing a product
which was both defective and unreasonably dangerous.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
33. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation contained
in paragraphs 1 through 30.
34. Defendants have misrepresented to plaintiffs and to the
medical profession that the said products were adequately and
fully tested and that they were safe for use as directed and would
cause no serious or deadly long range side effects.
35. Defendants made these misrepresentations knowingly,
recklessly, negligently or innocently, and with the intention that
plaintiffs and the medical profession rely upon them, which they
did, to the detriment of plaintiffs, rendering defendants liable
therefor.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
36. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation contained
in paragraphs 1 through 3, 5 through 30, 32, 34 and 35.
37. This action is brought by plaintiffs in the status of a
private attorney general to vindicate the rights of the group of
persons previously identified in the pleadings at paragraph 4 by
obtaining the relief previously stated.
38. Pursuant to various provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, and especially 21 U.S.C. 351, 352, 355
and 375, the Federal Government has the power to demand from
defendants the corrective relief sought privately in preceding
causes of action, but has failed to do so, wherefore plaintiff main-
tains this action as a private attorney general.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the First, Second and Third
Causes of Action, maintained as a class or individual action, and
on the basis of the Fourth Cause of Action, adopting the liability
theories of the first three, but proceeding by the standing of a
private attorney general's action, plaintiff requests that the Court
order that defendants: Create a fund, proportionate to each de-
fendant's volume of sales of these drugs and profits over the years,
which fund will be utilized under the supervision of the Court, or
any body agreed upon to act on its behalf, to pay for:
A. Alerting parents, their female offspring and the general
public to the risks of development of these conditions and the
need for prompt and periodic examinations made of the girls at
risk;
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B. Alerting the medical profession, including physicians
who may have prescribed the said drugs in the past, by the most
direct and immediate means, including, but not limited to, visits
by salesmen, advertisements in medical journals and direct mail,
to the nature of the risk involved, to their professional responsi-
bilities in ascertaining to whom they gave the drug and in inform-
ing their former patients of the risks thus created and what can
be done about it, and to the available and developing modes of
early detection and prompt treatment of these conditions;
C. Conducting intensive medical research on an immediate
basis to determine what the mechanisms are by which these drugs
are causing these conditions, what the earliest signs of these con-
ditions are, so that they can be detected in their earliest phases,
what the treatments are which, if given in time, will prevent the
appearance of the conditions, and what the treatments are which
will cure the conditions once they have appeared;
D. Creating and maintaining a national registry of exposed
girls;
E. Examining each of the girls at risk periodically as neces-
sary; and
F. Treating girls who develop or show any propensity to-
ward development of these conditions.
Dated: New York, New York
August 5, 1974
PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
200 Park Avenue - Room 1507
New York, New York 10017
(212) 661-0055
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